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I. INTRODUCTION
Contemporary legal discourse concerning federalism has
shifted from the formal to the normative, that is, from a focus on the
fifty states as unique entities in the American constitutional firma-

*
The title of this Essay is inspired by a question raised repeatedly during the roundtable discussion of 'Federalism's Future," during the second day of the Vanderbilt Law Review
Symposium, on February 5, 1994.
**
Professor of Law, Columbia University. BA., Columbia University; J.D., Harvard
University. Research for this Essay was supported by the Walter E. Meyer Research in Law
and Social Problems Fund.
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ment to a concern with the values of federalism. This normative turn
has had some salutary effects. It has sharpened the debate over federalism, reminded us of the impact of the federal design on the substance of American governance, and underscored the interrelationship
of government structure and individual rights. But the normative
approach has also, paradoxically, moved the focus of federalism away
from the states. Many of the arguments offered on behalf of federalism are not distinctively associated with the states, but, rather, could
be advanced by the empowerment of other subnational units. Indeed,
many of federalism's values are the same as those urged by the advocates of local governments when they make their case for the autonomy of local governments from the states. As a result, much of the
"intellectual case for federalism"' often converges with the case for
decentralization, or localism.
The current normative emphasis thinking about federalism
may have been inevitable in light of the erosion of the conceptual
underpinnings that supported the traditional view of the states as
special, such as the notion of the states as "sovereign" and the belief
that the United States was founded by a compact of the states.
Moreover, the normative approach to federalism is surely a more
attractive way of addressing federal-state conflicts than an
antiquarian concern with the allocation of domestic responsibilities
between federal and state governments in the eighteenth century or
vaporous reflections concerning the essential features of "States qua
States."2
But a discourse that focuses primarily on the "ism" in federalism rather than on the formal features of the federal structure generates new difficulties. First, many of the values of federalism-as-decentralization are opposed by compelling countervalues-widely
accepted political norms that call for action at the national level
rather than decentralization. Although federalism suggests that
courts ought to enforce federalism-based restrictions on national
actions, the existence of equally important countervalues that could
be advanced by national action means that individual cases may
entail intensely political judgments concerning these conflicting
norms. A normative focus will thus provide an uncertain guide for the
resolution of federalism disputes.
1.
Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 1484, 1491 (1987).
2.
See NationalLeague of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 847 (1976).
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Second, normative federalism rests on an uncertain intellectual foundation. Even when values conventionally associated with
federalism are unopposed by counternorms, it will often be debatable
whether federalism actually promotes federalism's values. This
compounds the difficulty inherent in an assertion that federalism's
values justify the imposition of limitations on otherwise valid national
actions.
Third, as already indicated, the values said to be advanced by
federalism are not distinctively associated with the states. Many of
these values-increasing opportunities for political participation,
keeping government close to the people, intergovernmental
competition, the representation of diverse interests-may be served
better by local governments than by states. Although historically
federalism has been exclusively concerned with the states, leaving
local governments without constitutional status, 3 contemporary
federalism discourse often sweeps local autonomy in its ambit,
vindicating the states in terms more applicable to local governments,
or, at times, justifying federalism as a restriction on national power
because of the resulting benefits for local autonomy. This suggests
that state and local governments are allies in a common cause against
the national government. But states and localities are often bitterly
at odds, and national government actions have at times advanced the
position of local governments at the expense of the states. 4 Normative
federalism could thus weaken the states rather than strengthen them
if it provides a justification for federal interventions on behalf of local
governments in state-local conflicts. More generally, by lumping
states and localities together, the normative approach obscures the
distinctive legal features of the states and the significance of the
federal structure. In this way, federalism tends to become merely an
emphatic way of speaking of decentralization-a rhetorical trope with
special resonance in American history and law-without any particular application to the states.
This Essay attempts to refocus attention on the states and on
the formal legal features of federalism. These are the features that
distinguish the states from local governments and that give the states
their unique place in the American constitutional order. The states
3.
See Hunter v. City ofPittsburgh,207 U.S. 161, 178-79 (1907).
'4.
See, for example, Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood Sch. Dist. No. 40-1, 469 U.S.
256 (1985); Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982); City of Boston v.
Anderson, 439 U.S. 951 (1978). See also Roscoe C. Martin, The Cities and the Federal System
109-35 (Atherton, 1965) (discussing federal grants-in-aid directly to cities).
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have fixed boundaries; their borders cannot be changed without their
consent. They have territorial integrity; no state or other subnational
government overlaps the boundary of any other state. The states
serve as constituent elements in the structure of our national
government. The states have inherent, autonomous law-making
capacity: they can enact laws, regulate, and raise and spend money
without having to secure authority from any other level of
government.
These formal features give the states considerable administrative, political, economic, and cultural salience in our system, and
reinforce the position of states as relatively distinctive "civil societies"
within the United States. 5 As a result, the states are a focus of the
interests and concerns of many Americans. Citizens often think in
terms of states and make state affiliation a critical aspect of their
political, economic, and cultural identity. States are one of a handful
of focal points of political loyalties and concerns, and the distinctive
role of the states shapes the political culture of American society. The
formal legal features of the states thus have functional consequences.
They enable the states to promote the values associated with federalism better than local governments even though local governments are
generally seen as better embodiments of the values of federalism-asdecentralization. Local governments typically lack the political, legal,
and fiscal capacities and cultural associations to be effective
subnational focal points and counterweights to national power.
Finally, a focus on the formal features of the states has implications for whether and how courts ought to treat federalism as a
constraint on national government actions. Courts should be less
concerned with vindicating the uncertain values-the "ism"-of federalism than with the federal structure itself. The role of the courts is
to protect the formal features of the federal structure-the states'
fixed boundaries, territorial integrity, inherent law-making power,
and status as basic units for the organization of the national government-rather than to engage in the open-ended and value-laden assessment of the conflicting political values said to be advanced or
eroded by state or national action. The Constitution provides for and
protects the formal aspects of the states' existence, not the values
conventionally ascribed to federalism.

5.
See, for example, Daniel J. Elazar, American Federalism A View From the States 1425 (Crowell, 3d ed. 1984).
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To be sure, even without the indeterminacy of federalism's
values, a jurisprudence of federalism that is focused on the federal
structure may not always be easy to apply. The impacts of certain
national actions, such as conditional grants, preemption, and mandates, on the inherent law-making autonomy of the states are, rightfully, questions of considerable controversy. But the focus of concern
ought to be on the likely consequences of national actions for the
continued viability of the federal structure, rather than on the conflicting normative concerns associated with national as opposed to
state decision making.
II. THE PARTIAL CONVERGENCE OF FEDERALISM AND LOCALIsM

A The TraditionalContrastof Federal-State
and State-Local Relations
"Federal-state" and "state-local" have traditionally been considered to represent distinct, if not virtually antithetical, models of
intergovernmental relations.6 Even as contemporary courts and
commentators have struggled over the meaning of federalism and the
definition of legal standards for the resolution of federal-state conflicts in light of the expanded role of the post-New Deal federal government, the one constant reference point for exponents of federalism
has been that the federal-state relationship is and ought to be quite
different from the state-local relationship. Indeed, it often seems that
the principal purpose of the use of the term "federalism" is to emphasize that the states are special in the "federal-state" setting in a way
that local governments are not in the "state-local" setting. Judges,
scholars, and public officials have seen in federalism a constitutional
limitation on the federal government and a doctrine for the protection
of the prerogatives of the states from federal incursion. 7 No comparable federal doctrine protects local governments from either the federal

6.
See id. at 202 (explaining "[tihere is a clear difference in constitutional law between
the federal-state and the state-local relationship. The former is federal and the latter is defined

as unitary").

7.
See Morton Grodzins, Centralization and Decentralization in the American Federal
System, in Robert A. Goldwin, ed., A Nation of States: Essays on the American FederalSystem
1, 4 (Rand McNally, 2d ed. 1963) ("A Nation of States") (noting "[t~hose concerned about the
federal system are uniformly found expressing fear of the federal octopus").
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government or the states. In this view, the "reduction" of federalstate relations to state-local relations would be the end of federalism.
The difference between federal-state and state-local intergovernmental models is the contrast between the horizontal and the
vertical. In theory, the federal and state governments are on the
same plane. The federal government is not superior to the states;
rather, federal and state governments are "coordinate."8 Each is
supreme and independent within its sphere, with the Constitution
marking the division of authority. The state-local relationship is
exactly the opposite. State governments are, constitutionally, unitary
systems. The state is hierarchically superior to its local governments,
which "have been traditionally regarded as subordinate government
instrumentalities created by the state to assist in the carrying out of
state governmental functions."9
This horizontal-vertical contrast is often intertwined with
concepts of compact and creation. The notion that the United States
was created by a compact among the first thirteen states "has roots
deep in the political subconsciousness of most Americans." 0
President Reagan was, no doubt, speaking for much of the nation
when he stated in his first Inaugural Address that the "Federal
Government did not create the States; the States created the Federal
Government."' " In this view, the states were independent sovereigns
prior to the formation of the Union. 12 By entering into the federal
compact, the states agreed to divest themselves of a portion of their
powers and delegate them to their creation-the new federal government.13 The states retained the authority not transferred by this
limited delegation, and have continued to enjoy the "separate and
8.
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452,458 (1991).
9.
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 574-75 (1964). Accord Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh,
207 U.S. 161, 178-79 (1907) (stating, "[m]unicipal corporations are political subdivisions of the
State, created as convenient agencies for exercising such of the governmental powers of the
State as may be entrusted to them").
10. Walter Hartwell Bennett, American Theories of Federalism211 (U. of Ala., 1964).
11. Ronald Reagan, Inaugural Address, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United
States, Ronald Reagan 1981 at 2 (Jan. 20, 1981). President Eisenhower expressed the same
view of the federal-state relationship when he stated "the national government was itself not
the parent, but the creature, of the States acting together." Dwight D. Eisenhower, Address to
the 1957 Governors' Conference, Public Papersof the Presidentsof the United States, DwightD.
Eisenhower1957 at 489 (June 24, 1957).
12. See James Jackson Kilpatrick, The Case for "States'Rights," in A Nation of States 88,
92 (cited in note 7) (stating"[olur Union was formed by the States, acting as States").
13. See Richard A. Epstein, The Federalist Papers: From PracticalPolitics to High
Principle, 16 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol. 13, 20 (1993) (noting that "the dominant sovereigns where
(sic] the states, which.., ceded some portion of their power to a distant central government").
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independent existence' 14 which is a residue of their former sovereignty.15 As the Supreme Court recently insisted, federalism is a
"constitutional scheme of dual sovereigns.16
The theory of the state-local relationship is completely different. The states are not the product of a compact among the local
governments situated within the states. Rather, a local government
is considered to be a creature of a state. It exists only by an act of the
state, and the state, as creator, has plenary power to alter, expand,
consolidate, contract, or abolish any or all local units. The local
government is a delegate of the state, possessing only those powers
the state has chosen to confer upon it. Absent any specific limitation
in the state's constitution, the state can amend, abridge, or retract
any power it has delegated, much as it can impose new duties or take
away old privileges. The local government is, in short, an agent of the
state, exercising limited powers on behalf of the state at the local
level.17
B. The Rise of Localist Federalism
In recent years, some of the conceptual underpinnings that
supported the traditional view of the states as special have been
eroded. Among scholars, a historical account of the Constitution as a
compact of the people of the United States has supplanted to a significant degree the common understanding that the United States was
formed out of a compact of the states. 8 In this "national idea" of federalism, 19 although the people may have acted through their states in
framing and ratifying the Constitution, the prime movers were the
people, not the states.
From this perspective, the federal structure of the United
States is a result not of the federating of previously sovereign states
into a union, but rather of a decision by the founding generation,

14. NationalLeague of Cities, 426 U.S. at 845.
15. See James L. Buckley, Liberty and ConstitutionalArchitecture, 16 Harv. J. L. & Pub.
Pol. 55, 56 (1993) (indicating that the Framers "reserved to the sovereign States all authority

not delegated to the national government").
16. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452,457 (1991).
17. See Richard Briffault, OurLocalism: PartI-The Structure of Local Government Law,
90 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 7-8 (1990) ("Localism Part)).
18. See Samuel H. Beer, Federalism, Nationalism, and Democracy in America, 72 Am.
Pol. Sci. Rev. 9, 12 (1977).
19. See generally Samuel H. Beer, To Make A Nation: The Rediscovery of American
Federalism 1-25 (Harvard U., 1993).
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pursuing national ends, that the best way to organize the new nation
was with a federal structure that preserved the states as governments
and assumed a considerable measure of state autonomy. In this view
the states are not so much the creators of the union as its creatures.
Certainly, notions of creation, compact, and sovereign status
prior to 1787 can have little relevance for the thirty-seven states that
joined the Union after the ratification of the Constitution. The federal
government plainly created those states, not the other way around.
Indeed, the "highly arbitrary and abstract boundaries" of many of
these later states reflect not the contours of preexisting communities,
let alone the external borders of once independent sovereigns, "but
cartographers' and Congressmen's convenience."20
With respect to the original thirteen states, whatever the
historical record indicates about their legal status at the time of the
ratification of the Constitution and their role in the formation of the
Union, 21 surely these states are not sovereigns today. Although the
Supreme Court continues to refer to the "sovereign" states and the
"dual" or 'joint" sovereignty of state and nation, most scholars, even
scholars committed to the value of federalism and to the judicial
protection of the states from federal power, reject the idea that the
states can be described as sovereign. As Andrzej Rapaczynski has
noted, "sovereignty" in the strong sense means that the sovereign
must have final political authority over a domain and the subjects
within it. "Sovereignty" is sometimes used in a weaker sense when
20. Russell Kirk, The Prospects for TerritorialDemocracy in America, in A Nation of
States 42, 43 (cited in note 7). Accord Beer, 72 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. at 16 (cited in note 18).
21. Some recent scholarship has suggested that although the colonies were legally separate and independent of each other, the colonies did not become entirely sovereign states when
independence from Great Britain was declared, but rather they immediately became a part of a
continental American political community. According to Peter Onuf, throughout the revolutionary period, "the identification of the American states with the common cause [against the
British] and membership in [the Continental] Congress directly worked against notions of truly
independent statehood." Peter S. Onuf, The Origins of the Federal Republic: Jurisdictional
Controversiesin the United States, 1775-1787 22 (U. of Pa, 1983). The states tended to act not
as independent sovereigns, but as part of a community of states, with "mutual recognition" of
membership in that community serving as "the ultimate legitimating source of statehood
claims." Id. at 23. See also Beer, To Make a Nation at 200-06 (cited in note 19) (contending that
the colonies declared their independence from Great Britain and gave themselves state
constitutions only when authorized to do so by the Continental Congress). For a vigorous
restatement of the traditional view of the "legally independent status of the states prior to the
adoption of the Constitution," see Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed:
ConstitutionalAmendment Outside Article V, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 457, 469 n.37 (1994) (noting
that the Declaration of Independence referred to "free and independent States," the Articles of
Confederation expressly recognized the "sovereignty" of the states, and the Treaty of Peace with
Great Britain recognized the legal independence of individual states).
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referring to the American states to mean that the states have an area
of exclusive authority.22 The states are plainly npt sovereign in the
stronger sense: "[T]he federal Constitution imposes a variety of limits
on the states that are clearly incompatible with the absolute authority
entailed by state sovereignty in this strong sense."23 Moreover, the
Constitution "conspicuously drops" 24 the provision in the Articles of

Confederation that "each state retains its sovereignty, freedom and
independence."25 Further, given the capacity of the federal government to act under the Commerce Clause, the spending power, or the
Fourteenth Amendment to preempt state authority, 26 there may not
be any substantive area of policy-making authority reserved to the
states exclusively. It is doubtful, therefore, that state sovereignty
exists today even in the weaker sense. As the Supreme Court noted
in New York v. United States, "Congress has substantial powers to
govern the Nation directly, including in areas of intimate concern to
the States."27
With the decline of the historical and sovereignty arguments
for state autonomy, it is, perhaps, not surprising that commentators
and courts have turned to political values in their analyses of federalism. But given the sharpness of the traditional federal-state/statelocal contrast, it is striking that much of the contemporary analysis of
federalism blurs this difference, deemphasizes the formal legal distinctiveness of the federal-state relationship, and frames the analysis
of the allocation of power between the federal and state governments
in terms equally applicable to conflicts between states and local governments. The current federalism debate devotes little attention to
the states' formal place in the federal constitutional order. Rather,
scholars and, to a lesser extent, Supreme Court justices, have devoted
their energies to making what Michael McConnell has called the
"intellectual case for federalism" 8-a case which consists largely of
celebrating the virtues of political decentralization. Thus, federalism
is discussed in terms of normative concerns, but federalism's values

22. Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudenceof Federalism
After Garcia, 1985 Sup. Ct. Rev. 341, 351.
23. Id. at 349.
24. McConnell, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 1489 (cited in note 1).
25. Articles of Confederation, Art. H.
26. Rapaczynski, 1985 Sup. Ct. Rev. at 355-57 (cited in note 22).
27. 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2421 (1992).
28. McConnell, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 1491 (cited in note 1).
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are not distinctively associated with the states. As a result, the case
for federalism tends to resemble the case for localism.
As expounded by Justice O'Connor in Gregory v. Ashcroft, the
principal themes in the case for federalism-as-decentralization are
that "the federalist system is a check on abuses of government
power"; it "assures a decentralized government that will be more
sensitive to the diverse needs of a heterogeneous society"; it "increases
opportunity for citizen involvement in democratic processes"; it
"allows for more innovation and experimentation in government"; and
it "makes government more responsive by putting the States in
competition for a mobile citizenry."29 These values of federalism have
also loomed large in the work of such scholars as Lewis B. Kaden,
Michael McConnell, Deborah Jones Merritt, and Andrzej
Rapaczynski. 30 These values are largely the same as those conventionally ascribed to local governments and to local autonomy in the
state-local setting. Indeed, it would seem that the characteristics of
the states and of federalism that promote these values are even more
1
pronounced at the local level.3

What enables the states in the federal-state system to check
tyranny, promote political participation, reflect diversity, advance
innovation, and increase government responsiveness to a mobile citizenry? Underlying the claim that federalism will promote these
political benefits better than a unitary state are assumptions
concerning the small size of the states, relative to the nation, and the
fact that the existence of the states creates multiple centers of
32 political power within the federal system.
Small size is at the heart of the argument that empowering the
states promotes political participation. 33 The communitarian push for
29. 501 U.S. at 458.
30. See, for example, Lewis B. Kaden, Politics, Money, and State Sovereignty: The
JudicialRole, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 847, 853-57 (1979); McConnell, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 1491-1511
(cited in note 1); Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy:
Federalismfor a Third Century, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 3-10 (1988); Rapaczynski, 1985 Sup. Ct.
Rev. at 380-414 (cited in note 22). See also Robert F. Nagel, Federalism as a Fundamental
Value: National League of Cities in Perspective, 1981 Sup. Ct. Rev. 81; H. Jefferson Powell, The
Oldest Question of Constitutional Law, 79 Va. L. Rev. 633 (1993). In her Gregory opinion,

Justice O'Connor cites both McConnell and Merritt in setting forth her litany of federalism
values. 501 U.S. at 458.
31. See Vincent Ostrom, The Meaning of American Federalism: Constituting a SelfGoverning Society 7, 85 (ICS, 1991).
32. See Kirk, TerritorialDemocracy, in A Nation of States at 45 (cited in note 7) (noting

the importance of multiplicity, the autonomy of "narrower communities," and "smaller
communities").
33. See Merritt, 88 Colum. L. Rev.at 7 (cited in note 30).
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decentralization generally asserts that participation will be greater in
smaller units. All other things being equal, it will be easier for people
to exchange information and ideas, understand more about the issues
at stake, and deliberate with each other in smaller units than in
larger ones. It is often assumed that people in a smaller unit are
likely to have common interests and to share values and norms and
that, as a result, they may be more willing than people in a larger
unit to put aside individual self-interest and engage in public-spirited
decision making. As Michael McConnell explains, "the natural
sentiment of benevolence, which lies at the heart of public
spiritedness, is weaker as the distance grows between the individual
'' 4
and the objects of benevolence.
Small size of the political unit, the sense of community, and
political participation are intertwined and mutually reinforcing.
Smaller units are said to have a greater sense of community, which
facilitates participatory decision making. Participation strengthens
the sense of community which, in turn, promotes greater participation. Similarly, the individual is more likely to be heard, to influence,
and to make a difference in a smaller unit than in a larger one. The
resulting enhanced sense of "citizen effectiveness" 35 presumably will
lead to more participation, which, by reinforcing the sense of
effectiveness, will maintain and increase participation.
The multiplicity of governments also contributes to the argument that federalism promotes participation. Federalism assures
that there are two governments with general authority operating in
every part of the country. With two governments, there are more
offices to run for and more candidates to campaign for, contribute to,
and vote for than would be the case if there were only one government, thus multiplying the opportunities for citizen participation.
The other virtues of federalism are rooted primarily in the
multiplicity of governments characteristic of the federal-state system.
Federalism as multiple governments means that there are multiple
power centers in the polity. Considered "vertically,"36 the federal and
state governments "will act as mutual restraints," checking each

34. McConnell, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 1510 (cited in note 1).
35. Robert A. Dahl and Edward R.Tufte, Size and Democracy 41 (Stanford U., 1973).
36. A true federalist, of course, would deny that the federal-state relationship is a vertical
one at all. See Daniel J. Elazar, Exploring Federalism34-38 (U. of Ala., 1987) (stressing that
true federalism is noncentralization, not decentralization, since decentralization implies a
federal-state hierarchy whereas in federalism there is no hierarchy).
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other's abuses.3 7 Considered "horizontally," or in terms of the relationships among state governments, the multiplicity of states and the
constitutionally guaranteed right of citizens to relocate from one state
to another, to trade goods and services, and to shift capital across
state borders results in a vigorous competition among the states for
mobile business investment and taxpayers. Such interstate competition constrains state taxation, spending, and administrative expenses.
Intergovernmental competition may hold down the cost and increase
the accountability to the public of those government services provided
at the state level. The multiplicity of states gives citizens an internal
"exit" option in addition to enhancing the opportunities for voice.
Both increase the public's ability to constrain government. 38
The multiplicity of governments can increase sensitivity "to the
diverse needs of a heterogenous society," as Justice O'Connor suggested, 39 if some interests that are a minority at the national level
constitute a majority within the jurisdiction of a state. Federalism
facilitates the representation of geographically concentrated minorities by permitting those minorities to dominate in some state governments and by providing them with a territorial base to obtain seats in
the national legislature. By the same token, by permitting some important political issues to be resolved at the state, rather than the
national, level, federalism enables different resolutions of the same
issues in different states around the country.40 To the extent that the
relevant differences of opinion concerning an issue are territorially
concentrated, state-level decision making can reduce the number of
people who are on the losing side of the issue and, thus, hold down the
1
costs to individuals of government decisions that go against them.4
Moreover, losers at the state level may be able to obtain some relief by
migrating to other states where their position has prevailed or where
37.

Gregory, 501 U.S. at 459.

38. See John Kincaid, The Competitive Challenge to CooperativeFederalism: A Theory of
Federal Democracy, in Daphne A. Kenyon and John Kincaid, eds., Competition Among States
and Local Governments: Efficiency and Equity in American Federalism 87-114 (Urban Institute,
1991).
39. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458.
40. "Ifnothing but a national policy were made, then the minority that makes a different
policy in a province or state would not be able to make that policy. Federalism permits, indeed
guarantees, that there will be some subjects on which policy is made locally. Hence it guarantees also the possibility that such policy may differ from national policy. And if it does, then a
minority benefits." William H. Riker, Federalism,in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby,
eds., 5 The Handbook ofPoliticalScience 93, 153-54 (Addison Wesley, 1975).
41. Robert Bish refers to these as "political externality costs." Robert L. Bish, The Public
Economy of MetropolitanAreas 35-37 (Markham, 1971).
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they might be members of the state's governing majority. By contrast, the exit remedy at the federal level would mean emigration
from the nation.
Finally, Michael McConnell would also root the claim that federalism "allows for more innovation and experimentation" in the
small size and large numbers of states. As he explains, "[e]lementary
statistical theory holds that a greater number of independent observations will produce more instances of deviation from the mean. If
innovation is desirable, it follows that decentralization is desirable."42
These virtues of federalism-participation, diversity, intergovernmental competition, political responsiveness, and innovation-are,
of course, among the very values regularly associated with local
autonomy. 43 The case for federalism, thus, tends to approach the case
for localism. Moreover, to the extent that the values federalism is
said to advance are the product of the small size and multiplicity of
governments, these same features are the hallmark of state-local
relations and local governments as well. Indeed, local governments
are, as a rule, dramatically smaller than the states in both population
and area, while the number of local governments vastly outstrips the
number of states. If grass-roots participation, intergovernmental
competition, political responsiveness, subnational diversity, and innovation are promoted by the relatively small number of relatively large
states, then these values ought to be far more effectively advanced by
the empowerment of the far larger number of much smaller local
governments.
Many of the scholarly advocates of federalism appear to acknowledge that the normative values to be advanced through the
empowerment of the states would also be served, and perhaps better
served, by local governments. 44 As they recognize, to the extent that
42. McConnell, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 1498 (cited in note 1).
43. See, for example, Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1057,
1067-73 (1980) (noting the importance of local autonomy in promoting participation); Carol M.
Rose, Planningand Dealing: PiecemealLand Controlsas a Problem of Local Legitimacy, 71 Cal.
L. Rev. 837 (1983) (combining exit and voice arguments on behalf of local land-use regulation);
Michael E. Libonati, ReconstructingLocal Government, 19 Urb. Law. 645, 651 (1987) (discussing
the impact of "communalist thinking" on local autonomy); Vicki Been, "Exit" as a Constrainton
Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 Colum. L. Rev.
473 (1991). For a general critique of the normative case for local autonomy, what I have called
"localism," see Richard Briffault, OurLocalism: PartII-Localismr andLegal Theory, 90 Colum.
L. Rev. 346, 392-435 (1990) ("Localism PartIIF).
44. See Jean Yarbrough, Madison and Modern Federalism, in Robert A. Goldwin and
William A. Schambra, eds., How Federal is the Constitution? 84, 104 (American Enterprise
Institute, 1987) (explaining that "[allthough modem federalism does bring the government
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federalism is about the promotion of the political virtues associated
'with decentralization, federalism's arguments on behalf of the states
apply a fortiori to local governments.
Some commentators do not distinguish the states from local
governments in their analysis of federalism. 45 Instead, they bracket
local governments with the states and would have federalism protect
local governments as well as states from federal interference. Thus,
Deborah Jones Merritt notes that a "major advantage of federalism
lies in the ability of state and local governments to draw citizens into
the political process"46 and that "state and local governments check

federal authority by regulating areas that the federal government
chooses to ignore. ''47 She would apply principles of federalism to
review congressional actions that "meddle with local governmental
processes '' 48 as well as with the processes of the states. Similarly,
Michael McConnell treats the intellectual case for federalism as an
"argument for substantial state and local autonomy," for the
"devolution of governing authority to state, city, and community levels."49
A second approach of normative federalists has been to recognize the distinct status of local governments, but to urge that the
empowerment of the states will indirectly benefit both local governments and the federalism values that they-more than the
states-can advance. As Andrzej Rapaczynski notes, "if there is some
genuine room for instrumental participation in American political life,
it can realistically exist only on the local level. ' O Federalism can
advance participation at the local level, he suggests, because
"practically all the local political bodies that may be suitable for the
development of participatory politics function under the umbrellas of
state government."'51
Yet federalism and localism are not inevitable allies, and
states and local governments frequently come into conflict. A federal-

'closer' to the people... it does not provide the citizens with an active and continuing opportunity to participate in public affairs. Direct democracy is no more possible at the state level than
it is at the national level. The one place where direct democracy is possible in the extended
republic is in the localities).
45. Kaden, 79 Colum. L. Rev. at 852 n.35 (cited in note 30).
46. Merritt, 88 Colum. L. Rev. at 7 (cited in note 30).
47. Id. at 6.
48. Id. at 49.
49. McConnell, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 1511 (cited in note 1).
50. Rapaczynski, 1985 S. Ct. Rev. at 402 (cited in note 22).
51. Id.
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ism that strengthens the autonomy of the states with respect to the
national government will not necessarily increase the autonomy of
local governments with respect to their states, and a federalism that
promotes local autonomy could weaken the position of the states. In a
recent article endorsing the Supreme Court's New York v. United
States decision, H. Jefferson Powell captured the tension inherent in
turning federalism into a device for the protection of values associated
with local government. Powell saw in New York the praiseworthy
beginning of the development of federalism doctrines that provide
"legal techniques by which a space for local agendas, local deliberation, and local decision making can be created and preserved," but he
acknowledged that the use of the "traditional terminology" of federalism is "not without its problems. '52 As he dryly observed: "[M]any of
the 'states' that are the historical and primary referents of federalism
talk are part of the problem of remote and nonparticipatory government."3 As he noted, "[a] great deal of creative thought and action
remains necessary if the language of federalism is to be used effectively to pursue democratic ends."' Put another way, the use of federalism to pursue "democratic" ends, defined as local autonomy, can
come into conflict with the use of federalism to defend the states.
In other words, if federalism is associated primarily with a set
of values, such as the pursuit of democratic ends, that are linked to
decentralization, then federalism is not particularly about the states
at all. Indeed, the ultimate irony could be that normative federalism
will provide a weapon for national attacks on state autonomy in the
name of local democracy, rather than constitute a shield for the
states' defense against federal intrusions.
III. DILEMMAS OF LocAmsT FEDERALISM

A The Limits of Federalism'sValues
The normative turn in contemporary federalism discourse may
have been prompted by the erosion of the traditional arguments,
grounded in creation and sovereignty, for treating the states as special. With the loss of their historic pedigree as progenitors of the
52.
53.
54.

Powell, 79 Va. L. Rev. at 688 (cited in note 30).
Id. at 688 n.262.
Id.
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Union, and lacking the claim to sovereign status, perhaps the best the
states can hope for is to attach themselves to the political value of
decentralization. This might not be so bad for the states. Instead of
being "reduced" to the status of administrative subdivisions, the
states could be "raised" to the level of grass-roots democracies.
Moreover, a normative discourse based on the functional benefits of
decentralization might benefit the states by enabling decision makers
and analysts to get beyond the vague assertions made in the past
about the essential features of the states and instead provide reasons
for limiting national power and vesting certain responsibilities in the
states.55
Indeed, as the invocation of localism suggests, subordinate
units can do quite well in the political scheme of things without a
claim to being founders of the hierarchically superior unit, without a
claim to sovereignty, and without a claim to constitutional protection
against upper-level governments. Many local governments enjoy
substantial autonomy with respect to many matters. 6 They wield
extensive regulatory power over issues of vital concern to local communities, provide many of the principal services associated with domestic government, and enjoy considerable policy-making discretion
with respect to the services and regulatory matters within their jurisdiction. Although local power is, at its source, a delegation from a
state, that delegation is often quite broad and is rarely revoked. In
most states, local governments operate in major policy areas without
significant external legislative, administrative, or judicial supervi5
sion.1
Indeed, despite their formal status as political subdivisions of

the state, most general purpose local governments-counties and
municipalities-are primarily accountable to their local electorates.
In practice, they function as representatives of local constituencies
and not as field offices for state bureaucracies. Moreover, local governments' service-provision and policy-making discretion gives local
people some real decisions to make when they participate in local
politics. Local autonomy assures a range of diverse local responses to
public issues that take into account differences in local circumstances
and preferences, much as the existence of tens of thousands of local
governments gives "mobile citizens" choices concerning the mix of

55. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Rethinking the ProgressiveAgenda: The Reform of the
American Regulatory State 159-73 (Free, 1992).
56. See generally Briffault, Localism PartI (cited in note 17).
57. See, for example, id. at 39-58 (reviewing local control over land use regulation).
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taxes, services, and regulation when they select the locality in which
they will live.
Despite the absence of formal federal constitutional protection
or a claim to the more exalted status that federalism is said to provide
the states, localities enjoy considerable power. The political rallying
cry of "home rule" or "local control" has frequently been potent enough
to block challenges to local autonomy based on claims of equality,
individual rights, or the external effects of local action.58 Thus, federalism as localism need not mean the end of state autonomy. Indeed,
it is possible that in wrapping the states in the mantle of grass-roots,
participatory democracy-by treating the decision making of the
thirty million people of California or the seventeen million people of
New York as a kind of extended town meeting-federalism as
localism will ultimately strengthen the political position of the states.
Nonetheless, localist federalism could prove to be an uncertain
protection for the states due its very normativity. Many of the values
said to be associated with federalism regularly come into conflict with
other values that would be advanced by greater national power and
undermined by decentralization. It will often be unclear which value
ought to be advanced when the norms and counternorms collide and
the costs and benefits of each are weighed and compared. Moreover,
even assuming that there is a consensus that federalism's values are
the values that ought to be promoted, it will often be debatable
whether federalism actually promotes federalism's values. The actual
effect of federalism in advancing participation and innovation or providing protection against government tyranny is arguable. The intellectual case for federalism may provide no greater protection for the
states than history or the idea of sovereignty.
1. Values and Countervalues
The clash of values and countervalues is sharpest when federalism is conceptualized in terms of its capacity to enhance government accountability to the diverse preferences of different territorially
defined groups. For those issues that are resolved at the state level
rather than the national level, there can be fifty different resolutions
rather than one, with these fifty different resolutions reflective of the
concerns of fifty different state constituencies. The value of state
58. See Richard Briffault, The Role of Local Control in School FinanceReform, 24 Conn.
L. Rev. 773, 774-76 (1992).
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diversity, however, will frequently clash with the value of national
uniformity. This has implications for both the economy and for our
definitions of the rights of American citizens. In a mobile society and
an increasingly integrated national economy, people, goods, services,
and capital constantly are crossing state borders. Multiple and divergent state laws drive up the cost of doing business and the costs consumers pay for goods and services. Indeed, the existence of multiple
law-making bodies may make it difficult for people and businesses to
know what laws they are subject to and whether their conduct vio59
lates a particular state's rule.
The values of diversity and uniformity also clash when the
political and civil rights and liberties of individuals are at stake. Are
basic questions such as the scope of freedom of speech, the nature of
the government's interaction with religion, the procedural protections
provided those accused of crimes, the right to vote in state and local
elections, protections against public or private discrimination in employment or housing, and even the kinds of differentiations considered
to be discrimination-age, disability, or sexual preference, for example-to be considered matters of state citizenship, subject to diverse determinations by different state communities, or matters of
national citizenship, governed by a uniform national rule? During the
last several decades, questions of civil rights and civil liberties have
increasingly been resolved by national rules, apparently reflecting an
increasing tendency to view Americans as belonging primarily to one
national community. National standards now determine some of the
basic structural rules for state citizenship, such as the right to vote in
state and local elections and the organization of state and local political institutions. Thus, the value of federalism as diversity, and its
assumption of the existence of diverse state communities, has often
come into conflict with, and often given way to, the countervalue of an
expansive definition of national citizenship, including national
protection and support for the rights of members of the national
community.
Similarly, implicit in the idea of federalism as democracy is
that decentralization-the delegation of power to smaller
units-makes it easier for people to participate in the public decisions
that affect them. This assumes that all individuals affected by a
state's action have a right to participate in those decisions. A state

59.

See Rose-Ackerman, Rethinking the ProgressiveAgenda at 172-73 (cited in note 55).
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that permitted only some of its residents to participate in state politics or gave a greater weight to the participation of some over others
would fail the standard of participatory democracy. Yet a state that
includes within its borders only some of the people directly affected by
the state's actions should be equally problematic from a participatory
perspective. State actions regularly have external effects on residents
of other states. Indeed, virtually by definition, an increase in decentralization increases the possibility of spillovers. For some policies
and for some states the spillovers may be minimal. But in those areas
where state borders cut through metropolitan areas or economic
regions, the external consequences may be significant. The democratic virtues of state autonomy can, thus, come into conflict with the
inefficiencies and undemocratic features of imposing costs on unrepresented persons inherent in a government structure that increases
externalities.6o
The value of intergovernmental competition for a mobile citizenry also has a corresponding set of countervalues which limits the
force of competition as an argument for federalism. Competition may
empower mobile individuals but it also constrains state autonomy.
The capacity of capital, some businesses, and more mobile taxpayers
to flee the state-without departing the nation-limits the programs
that a state can adopt. The exit option makes it more difficult for
states to engage in certain forms of regulation or to adopt redistributive policies.61 As the Supreme Court noted in sustaining federal
taxation of employment in order to fund an unemployment compensation program in the 1930s, the failure of most states to adopt such a
program was "not owing, for the most part, to the lack of sympathetic
interest. Many held back through alarm, lest, in laying such a toll
upon their industries, they would place themselves in a position of
economic disadvantage as compared with neighbors or competitors."
2
The states were "paralyzed by fear."6

60. Compare Briffault, Localism PartH at 426-27 (cited in note 43) (discussing the consequences of the fragmentation of metropolitan areas for the ability of local governments to
advance the political and economic goals associated with localism).
61. "A prisoner's dilemma operates: individual governments are unable to carry out largescale redistributions of income because they fear that their high-income residents and businesses will relocate to lower-tax jurisdictions. Furthermore, the pattern of redistribution that
does emerge is likely to have little to recommend it on social justice grounds, with wealthier
states generally providing higher levels of benefits for 'their' poor." Rose-Ackerman, Rethinking
the ProgressiveAgenda at 169 (cited in note 55).
62. Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 588 (1937).
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Thus, intergovernmental competition may limit the capacity of
states to pursue their own political agendas, particularly when the
states would promote equality or aid the needy within state borders.
As was the case with the funding of unemployment insurance, national action may be necessary for the enactment of programs that the
states would adopt but for the prisoner's dilemmas that result from
interstate competition. A strong national government, with powers to
displace conflicting state policies or to induce the states to cooperate
in the national government's programs, may be essential for redistributive social policies and many forms of economic and social regulation.63
2. Does Federalism Actually Promote Federalism's Values?
Even when the values associated with federalism are unchallenged by rivals, the role of federalism in promoting the values
attributed to it-prevention of tyranny, representing minorities, and
providing
additional
opportunities
for
participation
and
innovation-remains debatable.
Perhaps the strongest argument for federalism is that it is, in
Madison's phrase, part of the "double security"--along with the separation of powers within the national government-for liberty.64 Thus,
federalism is said to provide "protection against abusive government. 65 Moreover, as Akhil Amar has urged, the role of federalism as
a check on the national government may distinguish federalism from
decentralization since, although most of the other values of federalism
can be obtained by decentralization in which the local units are legally subordinate to the central government, the local units have to be
legally autonomous in order to be able to protect the people against
66
central government tyranny.

63. See, for example, Paul E. Peterson, Barry G. Rabe, and Kenneth K. Wong, When
Federalism Works 232 (Brookings Institution, 1986) (explaining that "it is only the federal
government that has the national constituencies and independence from economic competition
with neighboring jurisdictions necessary to facilitate significant redistribution. And because
state and local governments are increasingly exposed to external economic forces, it is even
more difficult to include redistributive policies in their missions than it was in the 1930s when
the need for federal action first became fully apparent').
64. Federalist No. 51 (Madison) in Clinton Rossiter, ed., The FederalistPapers320, 323-24
(Mentor, 1961).
65. Akhil Reed Amar, Some New World Lessons for the Old World, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 483,
498 (1991).
66. See id. at 498-99.
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Unfortunately, no necessary linkage of federalism and freedom
has ever been demonstrated. There have been federal states, like the
former Soviet Union, the former Czechoslovakia, and the former
Yugoslavia, which were characterized more by tyranny than by liberty.67 Conversely, it would be difficult to argue that some nonfederal
nations-Great Britain or France to name two--are significantly less
free than the United States.68 The argument that federalism is necessary to secure freedom is, perhaps, a confusion of federalism with
constitutionalism, that is, government that is subject to fundamental
constraints. Federalism may serve to restrict government tyranny in
polities which generally impose constitutional constraints-whether
of a written or of an unwritten form-on their governments. But in
that case, it is the constitutionalism, not federalism, that is doing the
work of protecting freedom. Nations may be constitutionally federal
but politically tyrannical, much as nations committed to constitution69
alism are more likely to be free even if they lack a federal structure.
The critical variable is constitutionalism, including the acceptance of
limits on government power and protection of the legitimacy of political opposition, not federalism.70
Within the United States, the role of federalism-in the sense
of federalism as a protection of the states from the national govern67. Writing in 1987, Daniel Elazar listed nineteen nations that were, "by their constitutions," federal polities. These included the three socialist states noted in text, as well as other
countries, such as Argentina, Brazil, Nigeria, Pakistan, and the United Arab Emirates, whose
modern political histories have been marked by substantial periods of unfreedom. Elazar,
ExploringFederalism at 42-44 (cited in note 36).
68. Franz Neumann and William Riker both contend that there is a more robust connection between party competition and freedom than there is between federalism and freedom.
While federalism may support party competition by enabling a party that has lost a national
election to secure itself in opposition if it has a base in a subnational state, the examples of the
Soviet Union and Mexico indicate that a one-party regime can sustain itself for decades despite
the federal structure of a polity, much as Britain and France have long had successful two-party
or multi-party systems without federalism. According to Neumann, "[those who assert that the
federal state through the diffusion of constitutional powers actually diffuses political power
often overlook the fact that the real cause for the existence of liberty is the pluralist structure of
society and the multi-party (or two-party) system. Federalism is not identical with social pluralism; and neither the two-party nor the multi-party system is the product of the federal state or
the condition for its functioning." Franz L. Neumann, Federalismand Freedom: A Critique, in
Arthur W. MacMahon, ed., Federalism,Mature and Emergent 44, 47 (Doubleday, 1955). Riker,
with his characteristic bluntness, dismisses the association of federalism and freedom as an
"ideological fallacy." William H. Riker, Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance, in Aaron
Wildavsky, ed., American Federalismin Perspective 51, 54 (Little, Brown, 1967).
69. See Preston King, Federalism andFederation67-68 (Croon Helm, 1982).
70. See Riker, Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance, in Wildavsky, ed., American
Federalism in Perspective at 54 (cited in note 68) (noting that "the crucial feature of freedom is
not a particular constitutional form, but rather a system of more than one party'.
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ment rather than federalism as a check on the autonomy of the
states-in promoting freedom has certainly not been established.
Professor Amar suggests that federalism gives the states three different mechanisms for defending liberty by checking the federal government: legal, military, and political.71 The states can provide the people with legal remedies, to be vindicated by suits in state courts,
against federal violation of constitutional rights. The states as well as
the nation possess instruments of coercive force, so that state militias--"small but expandable popular 'shadow' armies organized by
state governments"72--could deter, and if need be, resist national
tyranny.73 Finally, state governments may organize political resistance to unconstitutional federal conduct.
Yet, these checks have not been important in practice,
certainly not in this century. There has been no significant use of
state legal remedies against the federal government to vindicate
federal constitutional rights. As Samuel Beer points out, the
"military version of how the federal design would operate is hardly
more than an historical curiosity today."74 Nor has state political
resistance played much of a role in checking oppressive tendencies in
the national government. Neither the Red Scare of 1919 nor the
McCarthyism of the 1950s, to name two examples, elicited a libertarian response from the states; rather, the states joined with the na75
tional government in clamping down on dissent.
To be sure, the states provide a political (and patronage) haven
for the parties out of national power, and, as Professor Amar has
observed, "states furnish opponents of national policy with an oppor71. See, for example, Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 Yale L. J.
1425, 1492-1519 (1987); Amar, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 497-505 (cited in note 65).
72. Amar, 96 Yale L. J. at 1493.
73. Professor Amar suggests that the existence of the state militias may have played a
role in the finst national transfer of power, from the Federalists to the Republicans in 1801. The
Federalists did not resist the transfer "no doubt in part because of honor among leading
Federalists, but perhaps also because of the latent military check of federalism." Amar, 58 U.
Chi. L. Rev. at 503. However, the most comprehensive recent history of the early years of the
American Republic makes no reference to any role of state militias in its discussion of the
peaceful transfer of power following the elections of 1800. See Stanley M. Elkins and Eric L.
McKitrick, The Age ofFederalism 726-54 (Oxford U., 1993).
74. Beer, 72 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. at 14 (cited in note 18).
75. Compare Neumann, Federalismand Freedom, in MacMahon, ed., Federalism,Mature
and Emergent at 48 (cited in note 68) (discussing the criminal syndicalism legislation of the post
World War I period and noting "[there seemed to be a race among the various states for the
most drastic legislation, and vested interests, their influence enhanced by the makeup of the
state legislatures, pushed through the bills.... On the whole, one may perhaps say that the
federal system may have speeded up inroads into the civil liberties rather than have protected
them").
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tunity to secure actual hands-on experience running a government,"
thereby enhancing their ability to constitute an effective opposition.76
But even in centralized systems, opposition leaders holding only
portfolios in a "shadow cabinet" rather than offices in regional governments have been able to mount effective campaigns to replace the
party in power. Neither the accidents of American history nor the
record of federal and unitary states elsewhere supports the argument
that there is a causal connection that runs from federalism to free7
dom. (If there is any connection, it probably runs the other way.)7
Similarly, with respect to the purported connection between
federalism and the representation of minorities, federalism is not the
same as pluralism. State autonomy will benefit primarily those minorities that are geographically concentrated within the borders of
some states. For those minorities scattered across a number of states
and, especially, for those minorities that have no connection to territory at all, federalism may provide little benefit. At the time of the
formation of the union, interests and positions on political concerns
may have had some correspondence with state boundaries and state
communities, but many of the divisions in today's politics-divisions
over questions of race, ethnicity, class, or gender, for example--do not
map on territory. State borders drawn one or two centuries ago are
unlikely to capture differences concerning current or future issues.
Instead, on many important contemporary issues national minorities
will also be state minorities, and it is not at all clear that federalism
will enhance the representation of minorities within states. Indeed,
as pointed out in Federalist Number 10 and emphasized by political
scientists and constitutional scholars ever since, majority factions
may be particularly tyrannical in smaller units. Federalism conceived
as the protection of local autonomy does nothing to secure the rights
of minorities within localities. 78 The argument is not that federalism
is harmful to the representation of some minorities but, instead, that
because of federalism's reliance on territory and on the historically
determined boundaries of the states, federalism may not benefit those

76. Amar, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 504 (cited in note 65).
77. See K.C. Wheare, FederalGovernment 48 (Oxford U., 1951).
78. See King, Federalismand Federationat 54 (cited in note 69) (noting "local, territorial
autonomy may easily prejudice the rights of other groups or interests (especially where these
form less than a majority) within the local community in question ....
To protect local,
territorial rights may easily conflict with the protection of the rights of minorities resident in
the locality").
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who are minorities on the issues of importance in contemporary
politics.
Finally, it is not at all clear that federalism promotes participatory democracy or government innovation. For much of this century, the states were generally considered to be the least representative, the least accessible, and the least accountable of our three levels
of government.7 9 By contrast, grass-roots participation in local government has occurred without the protections of federalism despite
the formally subordinate status of local governments in state-local
relations. Similarly, while proponents of federalism often cite specific
programs that were first developed in state "laboratories," it is
uncertain whether there is anything in the structure of federalism
that promotes innovation. 8
States have become more representative and participatory in
recent decades, but that is a result, at least in part, of reapportionment mandated by federal courts, federal civil rights and voting
rights laws, federal requirements of local participation as conditions
attached to federal grants, and fiscal assistance that stimulated the
states to take on new social responsibilities, as well as state-initiated
and state-level measures. As a result of the reformation of state government in the 1960s and 1970s, the states were in position to become
centers for the development of progressive and "new Democratic!'
alternatives to Republican and conservative national policies during
the Reagan-Bush era. But certainly much of the democratic character
of contemporary state governments is due not simply to state autonomy, but also to the imposition of national norms of representative
8
government on the states. '
79. See Alice M. Rivlin, Reviving the American Dream: The Economy, the States and the
FederalGovernment 92-94 (Brookings Institution, 1992).
80. Indeed, Susan Rose-Ackerman has argued that the intergovernmental competition
characteristic of federalism actually operates to discourage state politicians from undertaking
risky innovations. See generally Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Reelection, Does
Federalism Promote Innovation?, 9 J. Leg. Stud. 593 (1980). As Andrzej Rapaczynski noted,
"insofar as there is something to the laboratory-of-experiment argument, a unitary government
could avail itself of the same advantages by a partial delegation of authority to its local
branches, so that there may be nothing in the laboratory rationale that is peculiarly related to
the federal structure of American government." Rapaczynski, 1985 Sup. Ct. Rev. at 409 (cited in
note 22). Indeed, as Akhil Amar points out, "if experimentation is our chief desideratum, a
purely pyramidic government structure may well be preferable, enabling central planners to
shape and reshape government boundaries and policies for more carefully controlled
experiments." Amar, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 498 (cited in note 65).
81. To be sure, some aspects of the representative character of state government have
nothing to do with federal mandates and are entirely the result of state-level activity. State
provisions for direct democracy, such as the initiative and referendum, lack any federal ana-
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In short, federalism may not be necessary to promote the values it is said to advance. Federalism may actually interfere with the
attainment of those values, and even wien federalism does promote
federalism's values, it may come into conflict with other equally
weighty values that would be advanced by national power. This is not
to make the "intellectual case" against federalism as much as to suggest that such an intellectual case can be made. Normative federalism-localist federalism-relies on a set of political arguments, quasiempirical assumptions, and intuitive hunches that may be countered
by conflicting arguments, assumptions, and hunches. Federalism as
decentralization gives forceful support for state autonomy, but in light
of the many countervailing arguments available to proponents of
national power, it is not clear that it establishes a constitutional rule
for limiting the federal government. In any given dispute, the normative case for federalism will require some consideration of whether a
value advanced by federalism is at stake; whether federalism actually
advances that value; whether, or how much, the national government's action threatens that value; whether there is an appropriate national concern supporting the national government's action; and
how the balance between the harm to state-based values and the gain
for national-based values ought to be struck. Striking that balance
may require the assessment of empirical data concerning, for
example, the extent to which state actions have external effects, as
well as intensely political value judgments. It is not clear how able or
willing the federal courts will be to engage in this difficult analysis.
Of course, whatever the impact of normative federalism in the
courts, arguments from political values can be quite effective in the
political realm. Since the demise of the Lochner era, our reliance on
the private, not public, provision of most goods and services is largely
attributable to a political preference for free market decision making
over state socialism and social democracy, not a constitutional limitation on the scope of government. So, too, state and local governments,
bolstered by the widespread political support for the values of decentralization and state and local decision making, continue to play major roles in the provision of public goods and services and domestic
regulation regardless of the uncertain scope of constitutional protec-

logue. State-based direct democracy played a vital role in setting the political agenda for the
1980s as a consequence of California's Proposition 13 and other state voter-initiated tax and
expenditure limitations, much as the more recent voter-initiated legislative term limitation
movement may affect the political structure of the 1990s and thereafter.
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tion of federalism today. Like localism in the state-local context,
federalism as decentralization may promote greater respect for subnational decision making among national political leaders.
Nevertheless, the harder question remains whether normative federalism can, or ought, to be enforced in courts when the national government, acting within the area of its authority, takes steps adverse
to the values associated with federalism.
B. LocalistFederalismand the Status of Local Governments
Some legal academic commentators have dispensed with the
longstanding sharp differentiation in the constitutional status of
states and local governments and assimilated the latter to the former,
while others have treated the traditional distinction as not much
more than an annoying inconvenience to be overcome by "creative
thought and action."82 The blurring of the lines between states and

local governments has also found its way into Supreme Court opinions. The Court has been more attentive to the formal differences
between states and local government than the scholarly advocates of
federalism, much as the Court has continued to employ the rhetoric of
state sovereignty, to stress the jural uniqueness of the states, and to
reiterate the traditional view that local governments are no more
than political subdivisions of their states. Nevertheless, in a number
of cases, the Court has confirmed the importance of local governments
as autonomous decision makers, and has treated local governments as
political units that will advance political participation, community
self-determination, and government responsiveness to diverse local
values and concerns-just like the states. The Court has emphasized
the relatively autonomous, locally responsive cast of many local governments in considering the rights and obligations of localities under
the Constitution and federal statutes, much as it has shaped constitutional law to respect local autonomy in certain areas of prime local
concern.
In a number of the leading federalism cases, the Justices who
support strong federalism protections sought to extend to local governments the constitutional shield against the national government
they would accord the states. As their captions reveal, two of the
leading modern Supreme Court federalism decisions-National

82.

Powell, 79 Va. L. Rev. at 688 n.262 (cited in note 30).
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League of Cities v. Usery 3 and Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority4--concerned the impact of federal legislation on
local governments. Local governments were the principal beneficiaries of the NationalLeague of Cities' rule that Congress lacks authority
to displace state and local freedom to structure integral operations in
areas of traditional government functions. To be sure, Justice
Rehnquist's opinion in National League of Cities emphasized the
uniqueness of the states and noted that local governments were protected by federalism only because of their jural status as "subordinate
arms of a state government. 85 But many of the examples he presented of the deleterious consequences of the extension of the Fair
Labor Standards Act to states and localities concerned traditionally
local matters and local decision making.86 Similarly, in his Garcia
dissent, Justice Powell emphasized that the mass transit system operated by the San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority was "a
classic example of the type of service traditionally provided by local
government. It is local by definition."8 7 The services affected by the
federal mandate in National League of Cities and Garcia were
"activities that epitomize the concerns of local, democratic self-government. 88 In providing the democratic and participatory case for
federalism with a historical pedigree, Justice Powell urged that "[tihe
Framers recognized that the most effective democracy occurs at the
local levels of government, where people with firsthand knowledge of
local problems have more ready access to public officials responsible
for dealing with them."89
The Court's evocation of the importance of autonomous local
self-government to democracy in the United States was crucial to the
extension of the one person, one vote doctrine to local governments in
Avery v. Midland County.9° In Avery, the Supreme Court considered
and rejected the argument that since local governments are juridi-

83.

426 U.S. 833 (1976).

84.

469 U.S. 528 (1985).

85. NationalLeague of Cities,426 U.S. at 855-56 n.20. Justice White made the same point
in Wisconsin PublicIntervenorv. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 607-08 (1991).
86. See, for example, NationalLeague of Cities,426 U.S. at 846-47 (discussing the impact
of federally mandated costs on the provision of police and fire protection by the Nashville-

Davidson County, Tennessee, metropolitan government and Cape Girardeau, Missouri, and on
the affirmative action program of Inglewood, California).
87. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 578 (Powell, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).

88.

Id. at 575.

89.

Id. at 575 n.18.

90.

390 U.S. 474 (1968).

1330

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:1303

cially mere administrative arms of the state, and not autonomous
political decision makers, they ought not be subject to the one person,
one vote requirement. Although the Constitution does not require the
states to have local governments, to make them locally elective or
locally accountable, or to grant them lawmaking autonomy, the Court
found that the states, in fact, "characteristically provide for representative government-for decision making at the local level by representatives elected by the people."',
In practice, local governments
'"niversally" exist, enjoy considerable "policy and decision-making"
autonomy, and operate as representative institutions. 92 Thus, a
state--even one with a properly apportioned legislature-could not
provide for the election of its county governments in a manner that
promotes rural interests at the expense of urban voters. In this conflict between state autonomy and local democracy, the interest in local
democracy prevailed.
In a handful of other cases, the Court followed Avery's approach of emphasizing the separateness of a locality from its "parent"
state in order to promote local autonomy, and to weaken a state's
control over one of its localities. For example, in Washington v.
Seattle School DistrictNo. 1,93 the Court permitted the school district
to assert the Fourteenth Amendment to invalidate a state measure
that would have banned a local program of busing for school integration.94 In Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood School DistrictNo. 401,95 the Court permitted a South Dakota county to assert the

Supremacy Clause to preempt a state law that would have limited the
county's discretion to use federal funds. Lawrence is particularly
instructive. Turning on its head the assumptions that state and local
interests are congruent and that by assimilating local governments to
their states, localist federalism can protect both states and local governments, Lawrence involved a state-local conflict concerning the
conditions attached to a federal grant to localities. Federal law would
have made the funds available for "any governmental purpose." The
state argued that, as the county's creator and legal superior, it had
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 481.
Id.
458 U.S. 457 (1982).

94.

The state's ban on the local adoption of busing was not treated as a mere "internal"

redistribution of decision-making authority-an agency's phifting of power over a matter from a

field office to headquarters-consistent with the model of local governments as agents of the
state, but rather it was viewed as an unusual interference with local school boards' status as
"separate entities for purposes of constitutional adjudication." Id. at 482.
95. 469 U.S. 256 (1985).
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the sole authority to determine the purposes for which the funds could
be spent. The Court, however, read "any governmental purpose" to
refer to the products of local decision making. The Court found that
Congress had intended to promote local self-determination, not state
control over local spending. Thus, Congress and the Supreme Court
together vindicated local "freedom and flexibility to spend the federal
money as they saw fit,"' 6 thereby displacing the state's traditional
control over local fiscal practices9 7
More commonly, the Court has recognized an interest in local
autonomy in settings in which the state and some of the localities
were on the same side of the dispute. In Milliken v. Bradley,98 for
example, the Court stressed the legal disjuncture of a state from its
localities in order to reject inter-district busing as a remedy for
unconstitutional segregation in the Detroit school system. The lower
court relied on the provision in the Michigan Constitution that public
education is a state responsibility and Michigan law's treatment of
local school districts as creatures and agents of the state in finding
that the state had a duty to include suburban school districts in the
remedial busing program. The Supreme Court, however, turned from
the state's theoretical supremacy over its local governments and its
formal legal responsibility for local public services to the value of local
autonomy: "No single tradition in public education is more deeply
rooted than local control over the operations of schools; local
autonomy has long been thought essential both to the maintenance of
community concern and support for public schools and to quality of
educational process. 99 Despite the state's uncontested authority to
redistribute power and restructure the school system, the state and
its school districts stood on independent legal footings. The state was
not responsible for the actions of the Detroit board, and the suburban
school districts were "separate and autonomous" from both the state
and Detroit.100 The value of local control deserved respect and
operated as a brake on the lower court's remedial authority to
combine local school districts, notwithstanding the nominal status of
the districts as mere arms of the state.
96. Id. at 263.
97. See also Rogers v. Brockette, 588 F.2d 1057 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding that a school
district had standing under the Supremacy Clause to sue the state of Texas over conditions of
participation in federal school breakfast program, but finding for the state on the merits).
98.

418 U.S. 717 (1974).

99. Id. at 741-42.
100. Id. at 744.
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The value of local control played a significant role in another
leading education case-San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez.1 1 In Rodriguez, the Court rejected the claim that significant inter-district disparities in spending on education, resulting from
a state's reliance on the local property tax to fund public schools in a
state marked by sharp inter-local differences in taxable wealth, violated the Equal Protection Clause. The Court indicated that these
spending differences were justified because they served the interest in
local control of the schools. 10 2 Local control was considered both an

operative fact and a normative strength of the public school system.
Reliance on local resources secured local control of the schools since
prodding the states to provide more money for local schools in order to
promote inter-district equality would increase the state's control of a
school district's "purse strings," and thereby erode local school autonomy. 103 Thus, local autonomy provided a good justification for not
increasing the state's role despite the resulting educational inequities.14
On occasion, even when focused on the subordinate legal
status of localities-their lack of the "sovereignty" the states are said
to possess-the Court has managed to support local decision making
and underscore the separateness of localities from their states.
Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder'0 5 held that the
exemption from federal antitrust laws provided to the states under
Parker v. Brown'06 does not automatically extend to local governments, and that a state's grant of broad home rule powers to its municipalities is not by itself sufficient to immunize those municipalities
from federal antitrust liability.0 7 Community Communications thus
exposed local governments to liabilities from which the states are

101. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).

102. Id. at 51-53 (stating, "[t]he people of Texas may be justified in believing that other
systems of school financing, which place more of the financial responsibility in the hands of the
State, will result in a comparable lessening of desired local autonomy. That is, they may believe
that along with increased control of the purse strings at the state level will go increased control
over local policies").
103. Id. at 51-53 & n.109.
104. In addition to education, a concern for local autonomy has played an important role in
shaping the application of the Equal Protection Clause to local land use regulation. See generally Briffault, Localism PartI at 101-09 (cited in note 17). See also Carol F. Lee, The Federal
Courts and the Status of Municipalities: A Conceptual Challenge, 62 B.U. L. Rev. 1, 57-68
(1982).
105. 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
106. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
107. Community Communications, 455 U.S. at 52-56.

1994]

"WHAT ABOUT THE 'ISM'?"

1333

shielded. That was, in part, a result of the Court's determination that
local governments are relatively autonomous with respect to their
states. Indeed, the gist of Community Communications is that local
governments are not simply administrative subdivisions or extensions
of their states but are, instead, independent entities and, thus, do not
necessarily benefit from an immunity provided only to states.
Subsequently, the Court took some of the sting out of
Community Communicationsby making it much easier for the states
to extend the state action exemption to localities than to private
parties. Thus, whereas private parties can claim Parker'sstate action
exemption only for anti-competitive activities that are both the result
of a "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed... state policy"
and "actively supervised by the State itself,'' 1 s local governments can
obtain an exemption from liability without the need to prove that
their actions are subject to active state supervision. 109 The state
policy said to authorize local anti-competitive regulation does not
have to make any explicit reference to the displacement of
competition or even to economic regulation.11 0

A state's general

authorization of local zoning "for the purpose of promoting health,
safety, morals or the general welfare of the community" has been
deemed a sufficient authorization for local anti-competitive behavior
so that local actions taken pursuant to the zoning power are exempt
from antitrust scrutiny."'

Moreover, in an intriguing instance of localist federalism, the
Court recently explicitly relied on Parker's "national commitment to
federalism," by holding in City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor
Advertising, Inc.,112 that a municipality would not lose its antitrust
exemption even when the municipality or its political leadership is an
alleged "conspirator" with private actors in restraint of trade."3 Local
governments do not automatically benefit from Parker's federalismbased immunity, but the rules for obtaining Parker immunity are to
108. California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105

(1980).
109. Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire,471 U.S. 34,46-47 (1985).
110. Id. at 42-45. See also City of Columbia v. Omni OutdoorAdvertising, Inc., 499 U.S.
365 (1991). Much of the potentially anti-local thrust of Community Communications was
substantially ameliorated by the Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984, 15 U.S.C. §§ 34-36
(Supp. 1994), which eliminated money damages in antitrust suits against local governments.
The Act does permit localities to be sued for injunctive relief.
111. Omni OutdoorAdvertising,499 U.S. at 372-73.
112. 499 U.S. 365.
113. Id. at 374-75.
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be liberally interpreted to protect local governments. The effect of
normative federalism in muddling the legal status of local
governments, of simultaneously insisting on the federal-state/statelocal difference, and yet bringing local governments within the
11 4
umbrella of localist federalism, is apparent.
This is not to overstate the extent to which local governments
have been assimilated to the states or the extent to which local autonomy as a value has been raised to the level of federalism. The
Supreme Court continues to distinguish between states and localities
in a number of doctrinal settings. The jurisprudence of the Eleventh
Amendment and the scope of Section 1983, for example, are shaped by
the continuing distinction between the states as "sovereigns" and
localities as mere administrative units.11 So, too, the federalism protections the Constitution affords localities are most often based on
their status as political subdivisions of their states rather than on
their independent value in promoting decentralization. In many cases
there was no conflict between federalism and local autonomy, so that
6
protection of local control also enhanced the autonomy of the states."
Yet the tenor of many of these opinions often belies their formal doctrine. Listening to the music as well as the words, we can hear the
Court expound the virtues of local autonomy and the benefits of grassroots participation in government decision making. The values of
decentralization to the local level are used to justify decisions that
restrain the reach of constitutional norms and congressional power.
Moreover, local governments have been distinguished from their
states in a sufficient number and variety of doctrinal settings that the
"arms of the state" metaphor cannot be fully persuasive in explaining
why local governments are protected in the name of federalism from
the encroachments of federal authority. Rather, it would seem that
the normative values of local, as well as state, autonomy have been
subsumed into the definition of federalism.

114. See generally Wisconsin PublicIntervenor, 501 U.S. 597 (finding that local regulation
would benefit from the same interpretive canons that limit the scope of the preemptive effect of
federal statutes on state laws in a case in which the federal statute at issue expressly saved
state regulation from federal preemption but made no reference to local ordinances).
115. Only states are immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment, and local governments are not treated as arms of the state for Eleventh Amendment purposes. See Lincoln
County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (1890). Similarly, local governments are "persons" suable under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, but states are not. Will v. MichiganDep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989).
116. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1. Rejection of the local control argument in the school
finance cases would have imposed an enormous political and financial burden on the states to
address inter-local wealth and spending differences.
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At times, this can result in a paradox: the use of the values of
federalism to undermine a traditional tenet of federalism-the states'
power to determine the structure and powers of their local governments. In Avery, the Court's commitment to democratic local selfgovernment led it to hold that the one person, one vote doctrine applies to the states, thereby subjecting state rules governing the design
of local elective institutions to close judicial scrutiny and constraining
state authority to develop institutions that reflect state policy but
that deviate from the federal norm of equal population representation." 7 In Lawrence, the Court sustained congressional power to enhance local fiscal autonomy, and, thus, local capacity to provide effective local self-government, by finding that Congress could displace
state limitations on local spending practices. More generally, even
when there is no conflict between federalism and localism, the invocation of federalism to protect local actions, and the use of arguments
about political participation, decentralization, and democratic selfgovernment to justify federalism decisions makes it difficult to
distinguish federalism from localism, and to determine what, if
anything, makes the states unique.
IV. BACK TO THE STATES AND TO THE FEDERAL STRUCTURE

A. FormalDifferences Between States and Local Governments
There are several important formal legal distinctions between
the states and local governments. The federal Constitution secures
the continuing existence of the states within their existing boundaries. It makes the states the basic component units for the structure
of the federal government and for the amendment of the federal
Constitution. It also rests on the assumption that the states have
inherent autonomous governmental power; that is, it assumes and,
through the Tenth Amendment, assures that the states may, in general, legislate, regulate, and raise and spend revenue without having
to look to the federal government or the federal Constitution for
authority.

117. See generally Richard Briffault, Whw Rules at Home? One Person/OneVote andLocal
Governments, 60 U. Chi. L. Rev. 339 (1993).
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Local governments for the most part lack these protections and
powers. The federal Constitution makes no provision for local governments at all. Although some state constitutions provide protections and powers to their local governments analogous to the provisions of the federal Constitution dealing with the states, no state
extends all of these protections to all localities. Indeed, the federal
Constitution, as currently interpreted, prevents the states from making local governments basic components in the design of state governments, and few states provide any local role in the state constitutional amendment process.
The assurance of the continued independent existence of the
states grows out of the guarantees of a republican form of government
and protection against invasion and domestic violence. 118 The commitment that no state shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the
Senate secures each state individually, much as the Guarantee Clause
secures their existence collectively. Moreover, the Constitution protects the territorial integrity of the states. No new state may be
"formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State," nor
may a state be formed "by the Junction of two or more States, or Parts
of States" without the consent of the affected states."9 The states, defined in terms of their existing territory, are permanent components
of the American governmental system--"indestructible120 and irreducible constituents of the United States.
The Constitution provides no comparable guarantees to local
governments.' 2' The states can abolish or diminish the territorial
scope of their localities without federal constitutional constraint. The
general rule of state law is that the state legislature has plenary
authority over municipal existence and territorial scope, and can
dissolve local governments or detach local territory at wfll.22
Although state constitutional provisions for home rule, when available, may assure a measure of autonomy for local governments, they
generally do not guarantee the existence of local governments or the
security of local borders. State laws providing for the detachment of
municipal territory have been sustained in the face of objections that
118. U.S. Const., Art. IV,§ 4.
119. U.S. Const., Art. IV, § 3.
120. Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 725 (1869).
121. See Hunter, 207 U.S. at 178-79.
122. See, for example, Chester J. Antieau, 1 Municipal CorporationLaw §§ 1B.01, 1C.09
(Matthew Bender, 1991); C.Dallas Sands and Michael E. Libonati, Local Government Law §§
8.28, 8.31 (Callaghan, 1993).
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they violate home rule or state constitutional prohibitions against
special laws.123

As a result, although state boundaries are remarkably stable,
one state carved out of another in the last two centuries, 124
only
with
boundary change is a widespread phenomenon at the local level, with
local governments losing territory and occasionally being dissolved. 125
Although losses in municipal territory and outright disincorporations
are commonly the results of actions initiated by local residents pursuant to general state enabling legislation rather than actions taken by
state legislatures or administrative agencies against particular localities, state actions to diminish or abolish local governments are certainly not unknown-as both the residents of Brooklyn, who lost their
independent city as a result of the action of the New York state government last century, and, New York City, currently threatened by
the state with the detachment of Staten Island, have reason to
know. 28 In short, the states are fixed elements in the intergovernmental system, whereas the existence and territorial scope of local
governments are subject to the vagaries of state-initiated or stateauthorized change.
The constitutional protection of the territorial integrity of the
states has an additional dimension, the significance of which may be
understood only in light of its absence at the local level. The
assurance that no state may be "formed or erected within the
Jurisdiction of any other State"' 27 means that every bit of territory
within a state is within that state only and in no other state. There
are no overlapping state borders. Each citizen is the citizen of one

123. See, for example, Sands and Libonati, Local Government Law at 2; Eugene McQuillin,
2 The Law of Municipal Corporations § 7.26 (Callaghan, 3d ed. 1988). See also Terrance
Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal Power UnderHome Rule: A Role for the Courts,48 Minn. L.
Rev. 643, 694 n.199 (1964) (explaining that detachment is beyond the scope of home rule).
124. West Virginia was created out of Virginia in 1863 during the Civil War. A Unionist
Virginia "legislature" provided the constitutionally requisite consent. See James M. McPherson,
Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era 297-304 (Oxford U., 1988). In the late eighteenth
century, Vermont was created out of territory along the New York-New Hampshire border that
had been claimed by both states but had been organized by New York. Vermont declared its independence in 1777, but was unable to obtain recognition by the other states or by Congress as
a separate state until it was admitted to the Union in 1791. See Onuf, The Origins of the
FederalRepublic at 127-45 (cited in note 21).
125. See Joel C. Miller, Municipal Annexation and Boundary Change, in Municipal Year
Book 1988 at 59-67 (International City Management Association, 1988).
126. See generally Richard Briffault, Voting Rights, Home Rule, and Metropolitan
Governance: The Secession of Staten Island as a Case Study in the Dilemmas of Local SelfDetermination,92 Colum. L. Rev. 775, 780-90 (1992).
127. U.S. Conast., Art. IV, § 3.
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state and one state only. That state, in turn, is the only state with
the full powers of a state government with respect to that citizen.
Local government, by contrast, is marked by large numbers of
overlapping jurisdictions. Most citizens reside simultaneously in at
least two localities-a county and a municipality-and in most places
multiple special districts and school districts have governmental
authority over territory that also falls within counties and cities.
The difference in the existence of a protection against overlapping governments is, in practice, a far greater distinction between
states and localities than the presence or absence of a guarantee of
independent existence. The fates of Brooklyn and Staten Island notwithstanding, states rarely directly abolish existing local governments
or force the detachment of territory. Most local governments have
relatively stable existences. The states, however, frequently generate
new local units, especially special districts, and give them jurisdiction
overlapping or coextensive with existing local governments. Local
authority is fragmented, with many different governments having
different powers with respect to local residents but, usually, with no
one government having general power over all local matters. As a
result, it may be harder for residents to know which particular local
government is responsible for a particular local matter, and it may be
more difficult for local governments to respond to citizen concerns and
take effective action. In most places, no one local government will be
the sole government responsible for local matters or the distinctive
128
focus of residents' attention with respect to local concerns.
The federal government is structurally constituted out of the
states. The states are the units for the election of the officials of the
federal government. Members of the House of Representatives are
elected from districts drawn within states. House districts may not
cross state lines. 129 Senators are elected from the states at-large. 30
The President is elected by an Electoral College composed of electors
selected by the states. 13 Electoral College "districts" may not cross
state lines; indeed, typically, electors are elected from the states at-

128.
Wegner,
129.
130.
131.

See Daniel R. Mandelker, Dawn Clark Netsch, Peter W. Salsich, Jr. and Judith Welch
State and Local Government in a FederalSystem 30 (Bobbs-Merrill, 3d ed. 1989).
U.S. Const., Art. I, § 2.
U.S. Const., Art. I, § 3; U.S. Const., Amend. XVII.
U.S. Const., Art. II, § 1, cl. 2-3.
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large. 132 Should the Electoral College fail to elect a majority winner,
the President is selected from the top three finishers by the House of
Representatives, with the members voting in state delegations and
each state having one vote. 133 Although no federal elected official has
been elected by the government of a state since the ratification of the
Seventeenth Amendment all federal elected officials are elected from
state-based constituencies.
13
4
By contrast, since Gray v. Sanders'3 and Reynolds v. Sims,

5

the Supreme Court has interpreted the Constitution to forbid the use
of local governments as basic structural units for the composition of
the state legislature or the election of state-wide officials if that would
result in any significant deviation from the equal treatment of voters
in a state-wide electorate.16 The Court rejected the so-called federal
analogy-the claim that state senates could be designed on a one
county, one vote rule, and state lower houses with a minimum of one
representative per county and with the remaining seats distributed
among counties according to population-as appropriate for the
structure of state legislatures1l 7 As a result, local governments may
not be the building blocks of state legislatures, and cities or counties
may not be used as units of representation or election to state
governments if there are significant population disparities among
those local governments-which there almost always are. 138
132. Victor Williams and Alison M. MacDonald, Rethinking Article II, Section 1 and Its
Twelfth Amendment Restatement: Challenging Our Nation's Malapportioned, Undemocratic
PresidentialElection Systems, 77 Marq. L. Rev. 201, 206-07 & n.33 (1994).
133. U.S. Const., Amend. XII. Although the Constitution does not address the structure of
the lower federal judiciary, the longstanding practice has been to appoint federal district judges
to districts drawn within states, with no district consisting of more than one state. The
territorial jurisdictions of the circuit courts of appeals are based on blocks of states, with no
state divided into more than one circuit court.
134. 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
135. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
136. Nor can local boundary lines be a factor in the election of members of the House of
Representatives if that results in more than a trivial deviation from one person, one vote. See,
for example, White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 790-91 (1973); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler,394 U.S. 526,
533-34 (1969).
137. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 571-73.
138. See New York City Bd. of Estimate v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688 (1989) (invalidating one
borough/one vote rule on New York City's Board of Estimate). In theory, the principle of equal
population representation could be reconciled with the election of state representatives from
local units through the use of weighted voting or multi-member districts. One person, one vote
does not mandate election districts of equal population but can be satisfied with districts of
different population as long as representation is proportionate to population. In practice,
however, it has proved difficult to create weighted voting systems that assure equal population
representation. See Jackson v. Nassau County Bd. of Supervisors, 818 F. Supp. 509 (E.D.N.Y.
1993). Moreover, weighted voting and multi-member districts may raise the prospect of sub-
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The federal constitutional amendment process turns on the
participation of the states. The Constitution permits the states to
initiate the amendment process. More importantly, no amendment
can be valid unless ratified by three-fourths of the states, with the
states acting either through their legislatures or by conventions. 139 By
contrast, in all but two states, localities have no role in the state constitutional amendment process. No state gives a locality the power to
initiate constitutional change, and no state requires the consent of
any local government in the ratification of proposed state constitutional amendments. In virtually all states, the ratification of state
constitutional amendments requires the approval of the state-wide
electorate, with just two states requiring, in addition, the approval of
voters within some particular local subdivisions.140
Finally, under the federal Constitution, the states have inherent law-making autonomy. The states can legislate without having to
demonstrate any authorization from the federal Constitution or the
federal government. Implicit in the Tenth Amendment's reservation
of powers to the state is that the states had those powers in the first
place and did not derive them from a federal grant. If there is
anything to the rhetoric of "state sovereignty," this is it.
By contrast, local governments lack inherent law-making
power. Local governments are generally viewed as creatures and
delegates of a state, possessing only those powers the state has chosen
to confer upon them. Absent any specific limitation in the state
constitution, the state can amend, abridge, or retract any power it has
delegated, much as it can impose new duties, take away old
privileges, or alter the locality's boundaries. A local government can
act only if it can demonstrate that the state has granted it the
necessary authority. State courts frequently apply a rule of strict
construction, known as Dillon's Rule, named after its author Judge
merging the interests of minorities within the jurisdiction and thus may be challenged under
the Voting Rights Act. For a general discussion of weighted voting and one person, one vote, see
Briffault, 60 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 408-11 (cited in note 117).
139. U.S. Const., Art. V.
140. See The Book of the States, 1992-93 at 20-26 (Council of State Governments, 1992)
(indicating various mechanisms for proposing amendments to state constitutions and obtaining
ratification).
In Louisiana, if five or fewer political subdivisions of the state are affected by a proposed
constitutional amendment, ratification requires the approval of a majority of voters in the state
as a whole and also in the affected subdivision(s). Id. In New Mexico, amendments concerning
certain elective franchise and education matters require approval by three-quarters of the statewide vote and two-thirds of those voting in each county. Id. It goes without saying that local
governments have no role in the ratification of amendments to the federal Constitution.
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Dillon, in interpreting the statutory powers of local government.
Under Dillon's Rule, local governments may exercise only those
powers "granted in express words," or "those necessarily or fairly
implied in or incident to, the powers expressly granted," or "those
essential to the declared objects and purpose of the [municipal] corporation-not simply convenient, but indispensable.'' Thus, a locality
needs a clear and express state delegation in order to be able to
govern. When it is uncertain whether a locality possesses a particular
power, Dillon's Rule tends to create the presumption that the locality
lacks that power.
To be sure, this sharp differentiation between inherent state
law-making authority and the absence of such inherent local lawmaking authority is often muted in practice. The federal Constitution
imposes significant restrictions on the scope of state law-making
authority. The Commerce Clause, the Due Process Clause, the Equal
Protection Clause, the Privileges and Immunities Clause, and other
provisions of the Constitution constrain the range of state decision
making and remove many policy options, even entire substantive
domains, from state legislative agendas. The combined effect of
expansive contemporary interpretations of federal law-making power
and the Supremacy Clause's preemption of state laws that conflict
with congressional enactments further narrows the scope of state lawmaking autonomy. The Constitution does not protect the states from
federal displacement even with respect to matters that historically
were primarily fields of state competence, as recent Supreme Court
decisions sustaining federal legislation in,
such traditional state fields
as land use regulation, 142 public utility regulation,43 and alcoholic
beverage consumption 44 demonstrate.
By the same token, most states provide at least some of their
local governments a measure of home rule.145 Where it exists, home

rule tends to undo Dillon's Rule by giving local governments the general authority to enact laws and make policy concerning local matters
without having to demonstrate an explicit grant of authority for the

141. Mandelker, et al.,
State and Local Government at 91 (cited in note 128) (emphasis in
original).
142. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamati'onAss'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
143. FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982).
144. South Dakotav. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
145. Melvin B. Hill, Jr., State Laws Governing Local Government Structure and
Administration 43 (U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1978) (pointing
out home rule authority granted to cities in 41 states and to counties in 27 states).
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specific local initiative in question. Although home rule rarely protects local initiatives from subsequent displacement by conflicting
state laws, home rule does give localities power to initiate legislation
in areas within their competence, and that power is comparable to the
power enjoyed by the states relative to the national government.
Many local governments enjoy considerable authority within their
domains and have considerable power over matters of importance to
their constituents.
Nonetheless, there is still a significant difference between
states and local governments with respect to the power to take the
legislative initiative. Not all states have amended their constitutions
to provide for home rule, and even in those states which have so
acted, home rule is often not extended to all localities. Moreover, in
many states, home rule is limited to "municipal affairs" or "local"
matters. 146 The definition of "municipal" or "local" is often contested,
and many commentators have asserted that state courts have taken a
"constricted view" of what constitutes "municipal" or "local."'147 The

presence of a "state concern" mixed in with an otherwise "municipal
affair" may result in a judicial denial of local power to legislate.
The gist of the difference between state and local law-making
authority is that every local law is potentially subject to two challenges, whereas state laws are subject to only one. A local government must prove both that it has the power to adopt the measure in
the first place, and that its measure has not been prohibited or preempted by a higher level of government. State legislation is subject
only to the second challenge-prohibition or preclusion by the national government. The first challenge-source of authority to legislate in the first place-never arises. This is a source of enormous
strength for the states, much as its absence is the legal Achilles' heel
for local governments.
This state-local difference is most clearly seen in two areas:
fiscal affairs, and the determination of civil rights, duties, and relationships. Fiscal autonomy is a crucial aspect of government authority. As people demand more and more public goods and services, an
effective and responsive government has to be able to raise the funds
necessary to meet those demands. The inherent law-making power of

146.
147.
645, 646
Chicago,

Mandelker, et al., State and Local Government at 113-15 (cited in note 128).
See, for example, Michael E. Libonati, ReconstructingLocal Government, 19 Urb. Law.
(1987); Gordon L. Clark, Judges and the Cities: InterpretingLocal Autonomy 113 (U. of
1985).
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the states includes the power to raise money. Although the
Constitution prohibits certain specific forms of state taxation 148 and
imposes other more general rules, such as nondiscrimination against
interstate commerce, the states have enormous autonomy with
respect to taxation and borrowing. They may innovate new forms of
revenue-raising and new types of debt instruments, they may raise
tax rates, and they may increase their debts in order to raise the
money they desire to pay for the programs they prefer. To be sure,
state resources will often be inadequate, and interstate competition
constrains state fiscal autonomy, but these limitations are political
and economic, not legal. By contrast, local fiscal powers are limited
legally. Local fiscal authority "must be derived from the state, and a
grant of it will be strictly construed, with doubts resolved against the
existence of any particular aspect of the power."'149 States limit local
taxing and borrowing and often impose onerous procedures. Most
importantly, localities generally are not free to innovate or initiate
new forms of taxation and borrowing without state authorization or
permission. Fiscal powers are rarely seen as a part of home rule. In
the fiscal arena, local governments are dependent on state grants and
subject to state constraints. 150
Similarly, even under the most generous definitions of home
rule, local governments lack power to enact "private or civil law governing civil relationships" and to define and punish serious crimes.' 5'
As a result, local governments are largely excluded from legislating
with respect to the core areas of law and society--contract, tort, property, the administration of justice, criminal law, family relationships.
In the state-local setting, these fundamental questions-the traditional mandatory curriculum of the first year of law school with some
of the basic upper year courses thrown in-are committed to the
52

states.1

148. See U.S. Const., Art. I, § 10.
149. Osborne M. Reynolds, Jr., Handbook of Local Government Law 289 (West, 1982).
150. One analyst has noted the "growing dominance of state government within the state
and local sector" and has attributed it, in part, to the greater ability of the states "to look after
themselves with discretionary changes in sales and income tax rates," while local governments
"had to rely on the property tax." Roy W. Bahl, Jr., Changing Federalism: Trends and
InterstateVariations,in Thomas R. Swartz and John E. Peck, eds., The ChangingFace of Fiscal
Federalism56, 62-64 (M.E. Sharpe, 1990).
151. Mandelker, et al., State and Local Government at 133 (cited in note 128) (quoting the
National Municipal League Alternative Model).
152. See id. at 141-42. See generally Gary T. Schwartz, The Logic of Home Rule and the
PrivateLaw Exception, 20 UCLA L. Rev. 671 (1973).
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Indeed, even when examined through the prism of the federalstate relationship, the power to set the rules that govern fundamental
aspects of economic and social relations is left largely to the states.
Although the Constitution does not commit any of these areas to the
states exclusively, and, under current Commerce Clause doctrines,
Congress could enter into any of these areas whenever it wants, in
practice, law making in this area is to a considerable degree state law
making without direction from Congress. From both the federal-state
and state-local perspectives, therefore, the dominance of the states in
the determination of the primary legal rules of life is testimony to the
significance of the inherent law-making authority of the states.
B. FunctionalImplications of the FormalDifferences
The differences in the formal features of states and local governments have functional implications. Permanent existence, fixed
boundaries, territorial integrity, and inherent law-making and revenue-raising authority tend to make the states more effective political
actors than local governments, which are subject to abolition and
territorial modification, have fragmented and overlapping jurisdictions, and lack inherent legislative or fiscal autonomy. The states are
better positioned to function as political centers. They are more capable of responding to citizen demands and of taking effective action.
The permanence of the states, the greater clarity of their borders,
their enhanced capacity for political action, and their resulting
greater involvement in law, policy, and governance make it more
likely that people will see the states as focal points for political action.
Together, these factors increase the likelihood that people will focus
on their state as one of their important political and cultural identifiers. In addition to such factors as race, ethnicity, gender, and occupation, people will identify themselves in terms of their state. In short,
permanence, integrity, and law-making power contribute to political
capability which reinforces the political and cultural salience of the
states.
These formal factors also assure the political salience of the
states in the national political process. With presidents, senators,
and members of the House of Representatives elected in a process
that emphasizes state lines and state-based territorial interests, those
interests inevitably become a factor in national political decisions,
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much as a voter's "state perspective affects his choices and decisions"
in elections for these national offices.53 Federal and state legislative
districts, however, frequently cross local lines, and legislators often
represent fragments of multiple localities. As a result, they are less
likely to focus in their deliberations on the interests of particular
localities. Local interests will, of course, be heard, but they are not
guaranteed the same kind of automatic political attention that comes
from the election of representatives from the states and the constant
identification of legislators as representatives from their states during
the course of legislative activity.
Due to the states' permanence, clearly marked jurisdiction,
inherent authority, and structural role in the organization of the
national government, people are more likely to organize their
thoughts about the political world in terms of the states. This, in
turn, may lead people to think about some of the broader aspects of
American society-economic, social, and cultural questions-in terms
of the states. Indeed, although it is often assumed that the creation of
different states was intended to reflect pre-existing differences in the
population,M it appears that the formal features of the states in our
constitutional order are themselves a source of some of the
distinguishing social and cultural features that are associated with
different states, and not the other way around.
As Russell Kirk has stated, most of the states "were mere
parallelograms of prairie and desert and forest" when first organized
as states, but over time the "institution and practice" of selfgovernment in independent, non-overlapping, autonomous states, and
the reinforcement of the state-based interests and identifications
through the use of states in national elections have given different
states "some distinct and peculiar character as peculiar territories, by
fixing loyalties and forming an enduring structure of political
administration." 155 According to Daniel Elazar, due to their "settled
153. Beer, 72 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. at 15 (cited in note 18).
154. This has given rise to the frequent criticism that the states do not reflect distinctive
economic or social differences because state lines do not map on to such underlying differences.
As Samuel Beer has observed, "[ilf the purpose of the states had been to provide a level of selfgovernment functional to territorial diversity, then it would have been imperative, in this
rapidly growing and developing society, that their boundaries be changed from time to time. On
the contrary, however, our national policy has been to freeze the boundaries into a virtually
unchangeable form." Id. at 16. State boundaries were not drawn to reflect underlying
demographic or economic differences; rather, state boundaries have been the source of new
territorial differences.
155. Kirk, TerritorialDemocracy, in Goldwin, ed., A Nation of States at 43 & n.2 (cited in
note 7). See also William S. Livingston, A Note on the Nature of Federalism, in Wildavsky, ed.,
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existence over generations156 and other formal factors, the states
have, over time, taken on some of the features of distinctive civil
societies. Elazar states that there are, to a greater or lesser degree,
common cultural, social, and political patterns within individual
states, as well as consistent deviations of particular states from
national norms or patterns. 157 The political and legal structure has
itself contributed to the differentiation of the states from each other
and to the creation of commonalities within individual states. The
formal features provide the durable institutional skeleton to which
other political, cultural, and social values have become attached,
much as coral settles on a reef or moss on a stone.
Thus, the formal features of the federal plan have made the
states "a part of the complex of sociological and psychological values
158
that constitutes the pattern of diversities" in the United States.
That complex of values which gives the states a certain importance in
the popular consciousness also reinforces their political position. As
William Riker has pointed out, "federalism is maintained by the existence of dual citizen loyalties to the two levels of government."159 A
system of multiple levels of government will last only if citizens are
willing to look to all the governments in the system when they make
their demands for government action. The capacity of the states to
take effective political action and the economic, social, and cultural
associations that have become attached to the states build loyalty to
the states as such forums for political action. Although the tendency
to think and act in terms of states may change with increasing national economic integration, the modern tendency to define rights
nationally, the high levels of interstate mobility, the emergence of
new non-state-based interests, and the formal features of the states
tend to assure that they will continue to play a role in people's
thinking about political matters and will endure as a framework for
governance.

American Federalism in Perspective 33, 46 (cited in note 68) (noting that at the time of
admission, the non-original states "may not have been sufficiently diversified to justify"
treatment as distinct communities, but "they rapidly acquired . . . consciousness of
individuality).
156, Elazar, American Federalismat 11 (cited in note 5).
157. Id. at 14-25.
158. Livingston, A Note on the Nature of Federalism, in Wildavsky, ed., American
Federalismin Perspectiveat 46 (cited in note 155).
159. Riker, Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance, in Wldavsky, ed., American
Federalism in Perspectiveat 58.
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The federal-state/state-local differences should not be overstated. Many local governments have settled borders and a longstanding existence and are endowed with the fiscal resources and lawmaking authority that enable them to wield considerable power over a
wide array of locally important matters. These local governments are
politically salient to their residents so that citizens will turn to them
for government action. Interests tied to these localities may loom
large in the political deliberations of officials in higher levels of government. Localities will often be sharply differentiated from each
other in political, economic, social, and cultural terms, and distinctive
localities can engender loyalties among their residents. Historic
towns, big cities with distinctive social and cultural traditions, governments that consolidate city, county, and special district functions,
and communities with ample tax bases can be sources of citizen identification or politically salient communities. In addition, local concerns can loom large in state capitals. Local governments and local
interests are often far more powerful than their limited legal status
would suggest. There is a "cultural bias toward local self-government"160 in addition to the disposition to identify with state citizenship.
Nevertheless, due in part to the formal legal features that the
states possess and localities lack, the states generally have a greater
capacity for governance than do localities, much as the use of state
lines to structure the national government makes it more likely that
distinctive state interests will be attended to and respected in the
national government. Action at the state level is likely to be more
effective than action at the local level. These factors increase the
propensity of citizens to see the states as a governmental alternative--indeed, the principal governmental alternative-to federal
action.
To be sure, the actual practice of government and not the
formal distribution of power is critical in assessing the nature of a
polity. The former Soviet Union had a federal constitution but was
not federal in practice; political power in many states was
significantly decentralized despite the absence of formal legal
protections for local autonomy. Still, formal structural differences can
have an effect in shaping political developments. To the extent that
formal legal rules affect the distribution of power, the federal

160. Elazar, ExploringFederalismat 189 (cited in note 36).
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Constitution gives the states and state-based interests, concerns, and
identities a distinctive place in American law and politics. There is no
comparable provision for local governments and local interests either
in the governance of the nation or in the governance of most states.
The differences between states and local governments suggest
a subtle tension within the values advanced by the exponents of normative federalism. The intellectual case for federalism tends to
amalgamate the values of decentralization and of the creation of powerful alternatives to the national government, much as it tends to
lump together states and local governments. But the diffusion of
power down to the grass roots is not quite the same thing as the creation of multiple centers of power. 1 1 The differences in the basic characteristics of local governments and states mean that each is particularly suited to a different value.
Grass-roots democracy is possible, if at all, only at the local
level. Local governments are, for the most part, much smaller than
the states, and there are many more of them. They are much better
positioned to provide citizens with opportunities for political participation, to reflect diversity, to increase the likelihood of innovation and
experimentation, and to engage in the kind of competition that constrains governmental behavior. Local autonomy would disperse
power far more widely than would a system of strong states and weak
localities. Yet, the same features that connect localities more closely
to the grass-roots-their small size and large numbers-make them
less powerful politically and consequently less capable of resisting
pressures from higher levels of government.
161. In making this point and seeing the difference between the diffusion of power and the
creation of alternative centers of power, I was influenced significantly by Akhil Amar's distinction between decentralization and federalism. See Amar, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 498 (cited in note
65). However, I see Professor Amar's normative point in more positive terms. In Professor
Amar's view, the purpose of federalism is the checking function, that is, having the federal and
state governments "guard against each other's excesses and thereby protect the liberty of
ordinary citizens." Id. I agree with Professor Amar that "[tlhe best argument for federalism...
is neither experimentation, nor diversity, nor residential self-selection," which can be accomplished by decentralization without federalism, "but protection against abusive government."
Id. However, as I suggested earlier, although this is the "best argument" for federalism I am
not sure it is a persuasive one given the lack of any necessary connection between freedom and
federalism. See text accompanying notes 64-77. Indeed, as much of my criticism of normative
federalism suggests, I doubt whether federalism is helpfully discussed in terms of "arguments."
Federalism, or, more accurately, the federal structure, just is. It does not need an argument.
The structure exists and defines our government. The federal structure achieves a measure of
decentralization, and in some circumstances it can have the effect of limiting the national
government. But what it does by definition, and what is not fully caught in the conventional
definition of decentralization as the dispersal of power to the grass roots, is create alternative
centers of power.
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By contrast, although the states are, for the most part, too
large to provide real participatory democracy, they are more capable
than local governments of being viable power centers. Their formal
features give them greater legal, political, and fiscal resources for
effective action. Their constitutional protections and inherent powers
are reinforced by the greater resources and greater ability to mobilize
public attention that comes from their relatively larger size and fewer
numbers. Only the states can begin to address most of the problems
that would otherwise be the subjects of national action. To the extent,
then, that federalism is about the creation of realistic alternatives to
the concentration of power in the national government, the states are
better suited to that function than are localities.
Federalism and localism are, thus, different. Their different
features reflect the fact that they are about different institutions and
perform different functions. They can come into conflict, such as
when national efforts to advance local interests and visions of local
self-government result in the displacement of conflicting state policies. But even when there is no conflict, the current propensity to see
federalism through a normative lens obscures the real differences
between states and local governments; the distinctive characteristics
of the federal-state structure; and the legal features and associated
political, social, and cultural factors that enable the states to be centers of power in the American political system.
V. TOWARD A FEDERALISM WITHOUT THE "ISM"
Implicit in the normative approach to federalism is the argument that courts ought to take federalism's values, including those
associated with decentralization, into account when they adjudicate
federal-state disputes. Normative concerns-the impact on local
political participation or the loss of the potential for interstate variations-might, thus, be a basis for enforcing federalism-based restrictions on national actions. However, as many of the values of federalism have comparable countervalues that could be advanced in defense
of national legislation, this approach could lead the courts into intensely political judgments of the conflicting norms in particular
cases.
An analysis based on normative concerns could, in some cases,
require extensive empirical fact-finding and review, as courts determine whether a particular federal action adversely affects one of the
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norms of federalism. For example, the norms of federalism include
the protection of interstate diversity and state-level control over statebased matters. If a federal action would impose a uniform national
rule or shift control over a subject to the national government, courts
might have to consider conflicting data concerning the extent to which
the consequences of state regulation are borne within a state or, instead, the extent to which they generate the external effects that
might be necessary to justify such federal action. Courts might engage in extensive review of political factors, such as the extent to
which the prisoner's dilemma operates in a particular field, thereby
constraining nominal state autonomy and justifying federal displacement of the results of autonomous state decision making. Far more
difficult would be cases in which the norms of federalism conflict with
the norms of national action, as when the value of subnational participatory democracy clashes with the value of redistribution or when
the value of interstate diversity conflicts with the value of national
unity. These are essentially political decisions. If the courts were to
take the normative turn, and consider federal-state disputes in terms
of the values said to be associated with federalism, they would be
repeating, and perhaps undoing, the very sort of empirical analysis
and political decision making that ought to have occurred in the political arena.
Given the likely indeterminacy of the conflicting empirical data
supporting or opposing federal interventions, as well as the complete
absence of constitutional direction concerning the resolution of diversity versus uniformity or state participatory decision making versus
national redistribution values, a consequence of normative federalism
is its potential for the simple substitution of judicial preferences with
respect to the weighing and balancing of these pragmatic and normative concerns for the determinations of elected officials. It is not clear,
even in the theory of normative federalism, what justifies the displacement of political decision makers by judicial decision makers
with respect to these largely political questions.
If, however, one looks to the federal structure and the formal
legal protections and powers of the states within the federal-state
system as the central constitutional issue in federalism, then, the
focus of judicial attention would be not on the values of federalism,
but on whether federal action threatens the formal protections and
powers of the states. In a sense, this would result in a constitutional
law of federalism without the "ism." Courts would step in to protect
the formal features of the federal structure rather than weigh the
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implications of national actions for the values said to be advanced by
that structure-the values that compose the norm of federalism.
Those values would not, of course, be cast entirely adrift. The
formal features of the federal structure-the guarantee of state existence, the nonoverlapping boundaries, the use of states as the basic
constitutive units in the national government, and the inherent lawmaking power of the states-in combination with other factors in our
politics and culture which make the states politically salient to the
American people, would be the primary guarantor of those values.
This is not to make the dubious argument that the representation of
the states in Congress assures that the interests of state governments
are taken into account by the national legislature. Certainly, since
the ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment, state governments
are not at all represented in Congress, and the use of states as units
of representation does nothing to assure that members of Congress
represent the interests of state governments. Rather, the argument is
that the design of the constitutional system-including the protection
of the states as exclusive, autonomous decision makers within guaranteed borders, as well as the use of state lines in the election of
national officials-creates a political environment in which people,
both officeholders and ordinary citizens, are taught to think in terms
of states and in which state affiliation becomes one of the important
political interests that people have. This assures that the states will
be a factor in the political calculus, and that the states will remain
political centers that provide important alternatives to the national
government for public decision making. How big a factor states and
state interests are in any decision, and whether government decisions
are taken at the state or national level, are properly decisions for the
political process, so long as the federal-state framework and the
consequent institutional incentives to think in terms of states are
preserved.
In a federalism focused on the federal structure rather than on
federalism's values, judicial action would be appropriate when national actions threaten that structure. Although this will avoid the
complex empirical and value-laden determinations inherent in normative federalism, even this standard will not always be easy to apply.
To be sure, on the recent record of federalism cases there does not
appear to be much of a problem of federal legislation threatening
formal state existence, state territorial integrity, the participation of
the states in the constitutional amendment process, or the representation of the states in Congress. It has, however, been argued that
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some contemporary modes of federal legislation threaten the inherent
162
law-making autonomy of the states.
Federal laws that would "commandeer" the legislative authority of the states, 16 3 and federal efforts to manipulate conditional preemption or conditional grants to conscript the states into implementing federal programs, have been assailed as inconsistent with state
autonomy. To some extent, these criticisms are hyperbolic: Federal
carrots and sticks that induce or even compel the states to engage in
legislative or regulatory activity as part of a national program do not
deny the states' inherent autonomy with respect to subjects unaffected by the federal program any more than does outright preemption, and yet the latter is seen as less subversive of state autonomy.'6
Still, such federal commands and manipulations are problematic. By
crowding state agendas with federal programs, and pressuring the
states to commit their personnel, treasure, and authority to federal
concerns, these measures can limit the capacity of the states to pursue their own state-initiated programs. 16 5 Moreover, by treating the
states as if they were arms of the national government, such programs may threaten to diminish the status of the states in the eyes of
the people, and, thus, in the long run, undermine the capacity of the
states to be independent decision makers and alternatives to centralized national political action.
This is not the place to resolve the important and vexing question of whether federal regulatory commands, or carrots and sticks
intended to manipulate the states into carrying out national ends, are
indeed inconsistent with the inherent law-making authority of the
states. But, when considered by the courts, the question must be
answered by examining the impact of national action on the capacity
of the states to be independent lawmakers and alternative power
centers within the federal framework, rather than by a more openended and value-laden assessment of the conflicting political values
said to be advanced or impaired by state or national action. As a
matter of law, the core of federalism is the formal legal position of the
states in the federal structure, and not the values conventionally
associated with federalism. In federal-state cases in general, the
proper focus ofjudicial attention ought to be on whether federal action
162. See Candice Hoke, Constitutional Impediments to National Health Reform: Tenth
Amendment and Spending Clause Hurdles, 21 Hastings Const. L. Q. 489, 555-73 (1994).
163. New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2420 (1992).
164. Id. at 2424.
165. See Hoke, 21 Hastings Const. L. Q. at 549 (cited in note 162).
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is inconsistent with the formal federal structure rather than on the
values of federalism.

